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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040638-SC

v.
MARK ANTHONY OTT,
Defendant/Appellant

REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF, POINT II
THE STATUTORY JURISDICTIONAL TIME LIMIT FOR
WITHDRAWING A GUILTY PLEA CANNOT BE CIRCUMVENTED
BY EITHER THE MISPLEA DOCTRINE OR EXCEPTIONS TO THE
PRESERVATION RULE
Defendant's supplemental brief acknowledges, at least implicitly, that this Court lacks
statutory jurisdiction to entertain the validity of a guilty plea where, as here, the defendant
does not file a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea. See Supp. Br. Aplt. 24. Defendant
nevertheless seeks review of the validity of his plea by invoking the "misplea doctrine" and
resorting to exceptions to the preservation rule. Id. at 23-29. Neither basis can confer
jurisdiction on this Court where none exists.
A.

The misplea doctrine does not apply to what would otherwise be the subject of
a motion to withdraw a plea.
Defendant argues that this Court "has the authority to nullify guilty pleas under the

misplea doctrine .. . provided that the misplea order was manifestly necessary." Supp. Br.

Aplt. 23-24. He then asserts that the "power to declare a misplea is not limited by the
jurisdictional nature of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6." Id. at 24.
It is true that a trial court may, under narrow circumstances, declare a misplea, see
State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294,1304-05 (Utah 1986), and that it may do so after announcement
of sentence, the statutory deadline for filing a motion to withdraw a plea. See State v. Lopez,
2005 UT App 496,128 P.3d 1. But once a plea is final—i.e., sentence has been entered—it
cannot be undone by declaration of a misplea. See Kay, 111 P.2d at 1303; State v. Casey,
2002 UT 29,146,44 P.3d 756 (Wilkins, J., concurring); Lopez, 2005 UT App 496, \ 20,25.
Thus, as a threshold matter, it is too late for this Court to declare a misplea.
In any event, the misplea doctrine does not apply where, as here, the challenge to the
plea would ordinarily be the subject of a motion to withdraw the plea. In Utah, a trial court
may declare a misplea—that is, rescind its acceptance of a guilty plea and set the matter for
trial—without offending double jeopardy so long as there is a showing of "manifest
necessity" and "no undue prejudice to the defendant." Kay, 111 P.2d at 1305. In other
words, once a plea has been accepted by the trial court, it may be set aside over the objection
of the defendant only when there is a manifest necessity for doing so. Id. at 1304-05. If a
trial court rescinds the plea agreement without a manifest necessity, double jeopardy bars
trying the defendant. Id. The misplea doctrine was developed "to protect the legitimate
interests of a defendant against capricious action by the court or the prosecution in refusing
to abide by plea agreements." Id. at 1304.

2

The misplea doctrine, then, applies when a plea has been accepted and when a trial
court—either on its own motion or at the behest of the prosecution—rescinds the plea
agreement over the objection of the defendant. See, e.g., Kay, 111 P.2d at 1296-97,1302-06
(trial court rescinded unilateral plea at request of prosecution and over objection of
defendant); State v. Bemert, 2004 UT App 321,ffif2-5, 7-12, 100 P.3d 221 (trial court
rescinded acceptance of plea at prosecution's request and over defendant's objection so that
case could be transferred to county for prosecution of greater charge); State v. Horrocks,
2001 UTApp4,t1J2-7,12-32,17P.3d 1145 Gustice court rescinded defendant's guilty pleas
over his objection so that greater charges could be brought in district court); State v. Moss,
921 P.2d 1021, 1022-27 (Utah App. 1996) (trial court sua sponte declared misplea upon
discovering defendant's guilty plea in abeyance violated statute). Cf. Casey, 2002 UT 29,
ffif 11,16,40 n. 14 (victim unsuccessfully sought misplea based on violation of victim's right
to be heard at change-of-plea hearing); Lopez, 2005 UT App 496, ^f 2-8, 14-27 (trial court
sua sponte set aside guilty plea before entry of judgment, but gave defendant a week to
decide if he wanted to re-enter plea).
The State found only one Utah case—an unpublished memorandum decision—in
which a defendant sought a misplea. See State v. Schubarth, 2005 UT App 166U. Schubarth
entered a plea in abeyance that was clearly illegal under the controlling statute. Id. at * 1.
Because the plea was clearly illegal, the court of appeals held a misplea was appropriate. Id.
Although the court of appeals applied the misplea doctrine in reaching its decision,
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Schubarth was more about a plea that was void from the outset than it was about a misplea,
where the trial court or prosecutor had violated the terms of the plea agreement.
Nothing here, however, suggests that defendant's plea violated a statute or was void
at its inception. Nor did the trial court or the prosecution seek to rescind the plea agreement
over the defendant's objection. Rather, the only question raised by this Court—and seized
upon by defendant—is whether defendant's plea might be defective for lack of a sufficient
factual basis. That question is a classic basis for motions to withdraw a guilty plea, which
are governed by the jurisdictional time limit in the plea withdrawal statute. See, e.g., State
v. Bunker, 2007 UT App 290U; State v. Hale, 2006 UT App 434U; State v. Richins, 2004 UT
App 36,1Hf 6-10, 86 P.3d 759; State v. Farabee, 2003 UT App 353U; State v. Wilson, 2002
UT App 360U; State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 670 (Utah App. 1993).
As explained in the State's opening supplemental brief, if defendant had attempted
to raise this claim on appeal, this Court would have lacked jurisdiction to address it because
defendant never filed a motion to withdraw his plea. See State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ffl[
10-14, 167P.3d 1046; Grimmettv. State, 2007 UT 11,1125, 152?.3d 306; State v. Merrill,
2005 UT 34,ffif13-20, 114 P.3d 585; State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f 3, 40 P.3d 630. That
statutory jurisdictional time bar cannot be circumvented merely by recasting what should
have been a motion to withdraw the plea into a request for a misplea. To hold otherwise
would be "to invite every tardy application to withdraw a plea to be styled as [a request for
a misplea]." Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ^[ 14. The misplea doctrine, therefore, cannot confer
jurisdiction on this Court to review the validity of defendant's Alfordplez.
4

B.

Exceptions to the preservation rule do not permit an appellate court to reach an
issue over which it lacks jurisdiction.
Defendant argues that this Court "may also choose to employ the exceptional

circumstances and/or plain error doctrine in correcting the erroneous entry of Ott's pleas."
Supp. Br. Aplt. 24-25. Alternatively, defendant contends that this Court "may choose to
employ the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine to invalidate the pleas." Id. at 26.
This Court has expressly held, however, that exceptions to the preservation rule, such
as plain error, do not allow it to "choose" to review the validity of a guilty plea in which no
timely motion to withdraw has been filed: "This court may choose to review an issue not
properly preserved for plain error. It cannot, however, use plain error to reach an issue over
which it has no jurisdiction." Reyes, 2002 UT 13, ^ 4. This Court has also expressly held
that ineffective assistance of counsel claims do not confer jurisdiction on this Court to review
an untimely motion to withdraw a plea. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ^f 10-14.
This Court may not, therefore, address the validity of defendant's guilty plea under
an exception to the preservation rule.1

1

The jurisdictional requirement that a defendant move to withdraw a guilty plea
first in the trial court rests on sound policy: the need for a factual context. When a
defendant does not move to withdraw a guilty plea in the trial court, a factual record
supporting or refuting a defendant's claim that his plea was not knowing or voluntary has
not yet been developed. In that regard, the plea withdrawal statute ensures the
opportunity of developing a full factual record before the validity of a plea receives
appellate review. If a defendant files a timely motion to withdraw the plea, the trial court
can hold an evidentiary hearing. If a defendant does not timely move to withdraw, he is
then directed to file a petition for post-conviction relief where he may seek an evidentiary
hearing on his claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(c) (West 2004).
5

REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF, POINT I
A SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS EXISTS TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S PLEA THAT HE INTENTIONALLY OR
KNOWINGLY KILLED ANOTHER
The parties agree that the aggravated murder statute requires that defendant
intentionally or knowingly, as opposed to accidentally, caused the death of another. See
Supp. Br. Aplt. 15-17. The only real dispute on the merits is whether there was a sufficient
factual basis showing that defendant faced a substantial risk of conviction for aggravated
murder if he had gone to trial. Compare id. at 17-23 with State's Supp. Br. at 5-14.
Defendant argues that Judge Allphin incorrectly "concluded that when someone lights
a home on fire when he knows it is occupied, this demonstrates intent to kill the occupants,
and that because [defendant] knew that Donna Ott was in the house at the time he lit the fire,
it could be inferred that he intended to kill her," and that this intent to kill "transferred to the
death of Lacey Lawrence." Supp. Br. Aplt. 20-21. Defendant does not contend that the
doctrine of transferred intent would not apply if the record showed he intended to kill anyone
in the house by setting fire; he argues only that the record does not support such an inference.
Specifically, defendant argues that "setting fire in or to an occupied building does not
necessarily encompass knowledge or intent to kill the occupants." Id. at 21 n. 17.
Defendant ignores the record evidence showing that he did much more than set fire
to an occupied building. After buying all the supplies necessary to commit arson,
defendant—in the middle of the night—cut the phone lines to the house; stabbed Allen
Lawrence and his step-daughter; doused the living room, hall, and master bedroom with
6

gasoline; and started the fire in the living room, near the front door. Rl3 81:84-89,109-16,
121,140,149,161-63,182-83,221,232-35,256. Although Allen Lawrence and defendant's
step-daughter had left the home by the time defendant set the fire, the record does not state
that defendant actually knew that they had left. R1381:183-84, 193. The record shows,
however, that defendant at least knew that his wife and another step-daughter were still in
the home when he set the fire. R1381:116-17,143-46. He also knew that his step-children
slept in the basement and were likely to have friends sleeping over on a holiday weekend.
R1381:15-16,22,108,125-26,190; R1382:283. Finally, defendant knewthat his own young
children were not in the house. R1381:21, 50-51, 107.
Taken together, the foregoing facts support a reasonable inference that defendant
intended to kill the occupants in the house, or at least knew that his conduct was reasonably
certain to cause death. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (West 2004) (defining when a person
acts knowingly or with knowledge). Defendant attacked when he knew the occupants—who
included minors—were likely to be sleeping and thus at their most vulnerable; he cut the
phone lines to prevent the occupants from summoning help; he set the fire so as to cut off a
primary escape route; and he made sure that although his step-children were in harm's way,
his own children were not.
Defendant nevertheless asserts that there was "no evidence that [he] intended for
Allen Lawrence or anyone to die in the fire... which he set after Allen Lawrence and Sarah
Gooch had left the house." Supp. Br. Aplt. at 20 n. 15. As stated, however, the record does
not expressly state that defendant knew that Allen Lawrence and Sarah had already escaped
7

from the house before he set the fire. Rl 3 81:183-84,193. Defendant lefta badly-injured and
bleeding Lawrence near the front door when he went to retrieve gasoline from the garage.
See Rl 3 81:183-84,193. Clearly, Lawrence was no longer there when defendant returned to
douse the front room with gasoline. For all defendant knew, however, Lawrence and Sarah
may have secreted themselves somewhere inside the house. Thus, it is not at all clear that
defendant did not intend to finish Allen Lawrence off by fire.
Defendant further claims that the evidence did not show he intended that anyone die
in the fire because he "told Donna to get everyone out of the house when he set the fire and
. . . he did not stop anyone from leaving." Supp. Br. Aplt. at 20 n. 15. The only evidence that
defendant told Donna to get everyone out of the house was a police officer's preliminary
hearing testimony that defendant told him that he did this. Rl 3 82:283. That officer testified,
however, that defendant also insisted that he did not remember setting the fire or stabbing
Allen Lawrence. Id. And, in the same conversation, defendant told the officer that although
he knew that both his step-daughters slept in the basement, he did not go down to make sure
they were out of the house. Id.
The existence of competing inferences do not negate the existence of a sufficient
factual basis for purposes of an AIford plea. See State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671, 674
(Utah App. 1993) (in determining factual basis for plea, record as whole need not be
conclusive or uncontroverted on question of guilt; there must only be evidence from which
trial court may reasonably find defendant guilty). While a jury might have believed
defendant's self-serving statements that he did not intend to kill anyone by fire, it might also
8

have reasonably inferred from the foregoing facts that he did. This is the risk that defendant
sought to avoid by entering his Alfordplea.
Defendant suggests that his plea is nevertheless invalid because none of the "various
disparate factual and legal theories" was "discussed or adopted during the entry of the plea."
Supp. Br. Aplt. at 21. But as explained in the State's opening brief, whether a sufficient
factual basis exists is determined by resort to the entire record. See Willett v. Barnes, 842
P.2d 860, 861-63 (Utah 1992); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266,1273 (Utah 1988); Stilling,
856 P.2d at 671, 674. When defendant's plea hearing is viewed in light of the entire
record—including the preliminary hearing testimony—the facts and their reasonable
inferences provide a sufficient factual basis that when defendant set fire to his house, he
intended to cause the death of another, or at least knew that his conduct was reasonably
certain to cause that result.2

2

Defendant seeks to cast further doubt on the validity of his plea by re-asserting
arguments presented in his original briefs. Br. Aplt. 10-11, 22-23. As explained,
however, this Court lacks jurisdiction to address the validity of defendant's plea,
irrespective of the nature of the challenge.
9

CONCLUSION
This Court lacks jurisdiction to examine the validity of defendant's Alford plea.
Neither the misplea doctrine nor preservation rules confer jurisdiction on this Court. Even
if this Court had jurisdiction, defendant's Alford plea was supported by a sufficient factual
basis.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of August, 2008.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL

B.DUPAIX
:SSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
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